Designing payments for environmental services in the context of weak property rights and commercial interests

Details

Author(s):
S. Engel; C. Palmer

Type of Document:
Media

 

Publisher/Journal:
Not Available

Date of Publication:
2005

Place of Publication:
Not Available

Links
Description

Outline: 1. Introduction 2. Game-theoretic model of community-firm interactions 3. Implications for PES design 4. Empirical application 5. Conclusions

Using data collected in Indonesia on actual logging fees received by communities, we illustrate how the theoretical results could be used in empirical analysis to guide PES design. Our results are likely to be useful in other cases where local people make resource use decisions but have weak property rights over these resources, and where external commercial forces are present.

(Excerpt from corresponding paper Abstract)

Additional Bibliographic Information

Presented at the ZEF-CIFOR workshop: Payments for Environmental Services (PES): Methods and Design in Developing and Developed Countries, Titisee, Germany, 15-18 June 2005

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